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Abstract: In his recent article Philosophy Inside Out, Philip Kitcher presents a 
metaphilosophical outlook that aims at nothing less than a renewal of  philos-
ophy. His idea is to draw philosophers’ attention away from “timeless ques-
tions” in the so-called “core areas” of  philosophy. Instead, philosophers 
should address questions that matter to human lives. The aim of  this paper is 
twofold: first, to reconstruct Kitcher’s view of  how philosophy should be re-
newed; second, to point out some difficulties relating to his position. These 
difficulties concern the integration of  his naturalism into the pragmatic vision 
of  philosophy, the role of  putative philosophical experts, and the ideal status 
of  the program of  well-ordered inquiry. 
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1   INTRODUCTION: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF  
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 
In his recent article Philosophy Inside Out (PIO), Philip Kitcher presents a 
metaphilosophical outlook that aims at nothing less than a renewal of  philos-
ophy. His idea is to draw philosophers’ attention away from “timeless ques-
tions” (PIO, 252) in the so-called “core areas”, under which he subsumes 
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of  language, and philosophy of  mind. 
Instead, philosophers should address questions that matter to human lives 
and, thus, strengthen their work in certain areas of  philosophy that are 
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commonly thought of  as being only peripheral. This amounts to turning 
philosophy inside out. 
Kitcher’s vision of  how to renew philosophy precedes a pessimistic de-
scription of  its actual state. Following John Dewey, Kitcher puts forward the 
criticism that philosophy runs the risk of  becoming a “sentimental indulgence 
for a few” (PIO, 250). He argues that, especially in the Anglophone world, 
philosophers have developed a highly technical, specialized language in order 
to address questions from various fields (PIO, 250; IDP, 20). This has the 
unfortunate result that contemporary philosophy is often more engaged in 
performing finger exercises than in solving problems that are urgent for 
human lives.  
Kitcher insists that the situation in philosophy is, compared with other 
fields of  inquiry, particularly problematic (PIO, 250 f.). In the natural sciences 
there is a lot disagreement, too. But there are also reliable methods, and an 
understanding of  how small, seemingly unimportant questions can contribute 
to larger, significant questions. By contrast, the disagreements and controver-
sies in philosophy are not peripheral, but rather concern the core of  the 
discipline. Kitcher is especially worried by the fact that in philosophy there 
seem to be no reliable methods of  answering the questions pursued. He also 
claims that the technical questions addressed by many philosophers make no 
contribution to broader questions that would reveal their significance. 
Thus, if  Kitcher is right, large parts of  philosophy are currently in a mis-
erable state. This gives rise to the question of  how to change the present 
situation. How can philosophy be changed into a “healthy” form of  inquiry? 
The aim of  our paper is, first, to sketch Kitcher’s view of  a renewal of  
philosophy and, second, to point out some difficulties relating to his position. 
These difficulties concern the integration of  his naturalism into the pragmatic 
vision of  philosophy, the role of  putative philosophical experts, and the ideal 
status of  the program of  well-ordered inquiry. As we will see, the project of  
turning philosophy inside out is not as easy as Kitcher imagines it to be. 




2   WHAT INSTEAD? – KITCHER’S VISION OF A  
RENEWED PHILOSOPHY 
Kitcher’s positive view of  what philosophy is supposed to be is predominant-
ly influenced by pragmatism (especially by Dewey’s major works). Following 
Dewey, Kitcher opts for the idea that areas of  philosophical inquiry are 
“healthy” to the extent that they make contributions to human lives (PIO, 
249). Accordingly, the task of  philosophy is to address significant problems, 
that is, problems that “emerge from the circumstances of  contemporary life” 
(IDP, 24). 
However, it remains an open question as to what it means for a philo-
sophical problem to be significant to human needs, and how exactly this 
significance is determined. In his paper The Importance of  Dewey for Philosophy 
(and for Much Else Besides) (IDP), Kitcher presents an answer to this question. 
The underlying idea is that the assessment of  the significance of  philosophi-
cal questions can be modeled on his extensively developed account of  the 
assessment of  the significance of  questions in the sciences. That is, Kitcher 
extends his frequently discussed ideal of  “well-ordered science” (SDS, ch. 5) 
to a “standard for well-ordered inquiry” (IDP, 27), which holds for both the 
natural sciences and philosophy. Thus, he addresses the special case of  
philosophy as an instance of  a more global phenomenon.1 Before we turn to 
Kitcher’s vision of, as we call it, “well-ordered philosophy” let us sum up the 
main characteristics of  his ideal of  well-ordered science. 
2.1   Well-Ordered Science 
In several books and papers Kitcher discusses the role of  the sciences in a 
democratic society and develops an ideal of  “well-ordered science” (STD, ch. 
10; SDS, ch. 5). As resources for scientific inquiry are limited, democratic 
societies need a way to decide which lines of  inquiry are to be pursued at the 
                                        
1 According to Kitcher, philosophy has to be considered as “one field of  inquiry among 
many, part of  a constellation that extends from art history through zoology” (IDP, 26). 
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expense of  others. The standard of  well-ordered science is Kitcher’s answer 
to this problem, and can be summed up as follows: 
[S]cience is well-ordered when its specification of  the problems to be pursued 
would be endorsed by an ideal conversation, embodying all human points of  view, 
under conditions of  mutual engagement. (SDS, 106) 
In his development of  the ideal of  well-ordered science, Kitcher imagines a 
group of  deliberators that meet under the conditions of  an ideal conversation 
about the aims of  scientific inquiry and determine which research projects are 
to be undertaken. Kitcher identifies three conditions that ideal deliberators 
have to meet: First, the deliberators have to represent “all human circum-
stances and points of  view” (IDP, 27). Second, they have to be “thoroughly 
informed as to the existing state of  human knowledge and to the foreseeable 
prospects for developing it further” (IDP, 27). Third, they have to be “fully 
committed to mutual engagement with one another” (IDP, 27), which means 
that the interests of  minorities are not sacrificed to the interests of  the 
majority. 
The ideal conversation Kitcher envisions involves three stages (SDS, 114 
f.): In the first stage, the explanatory period, the ideal deliberators are “tu-
tored”: They learn about the status quo of  current scientific investigations 
and about future options. On the basis of  this tutoring they voice their own 
preferences as to which lines of  inquiry should be pursued in the future. In 
the second stage, the deliberators compare their different preferences and 
modify them in the light of  the preferences of  the others. Finally, the conse-
quences of  the different options for society, for the inhabitants of  other parts 
of  the world, and for future generations are assessed. It is in this third stage 
that the testimony of  experts is needed: How likely is it that a certain research 
project will be successful? What are the possible outcomes of  certain investi-
gations? At the end of  the three stages, the deliberators try to reach a consen-
sus about the lines of  inquiry to be pursued in the future. 
As Kitcher emphasizes, well-ordered science is an ideal that we cannot 
expect to arrive at in real-life (SDS, 125). But he is keen to point out that the 
ideal can nevertheless be of  great value if  we are able to envision “a path” or 
“initial steps” (SDS, 125) that might lead us towards the realization of  this 




ideal. Kitcher presents some ideas of  what these first steps could be (SDS, 
127-130). In addition, Kitcher thinks that, already today, certain clear cases 
can be decided according to the ideal, without even starting to implement the 
first steps (e.g., that biomedical research must not neglect diseases that mainly 
afflict underprivileged people; SDS, 127). 
2.2   Well-Ordered Philosophy 
In his recent work, Kitcher suggests that in philosophy a similar procedure 
for evaluating the significance of  questions can be established. According to 
the standard of  well-ordered inquiry, a group of  deliberators engage in an 
ideal conversation and decide which philosophical questions are significant 
and should be included into the research agenda. The overall question the 
deliberators have to ask themselves is whether a certain philosophical ques-
tion constitutes a real problem for many people, and whether answering that 
question helps to solve a problem that matters to human lives. 
But what exactly are the consequences of  implementing this ideal of  
well-ordered inquiry in philosophy? What does it mean for different philo-
sophical projects and fields that the significance of  questions is determined 
by the contribution they make to satisfying human needs? In Philosophy Inside 
Out, Kitcher gives further hints on what the renewed, well-ordered philosophy 
should look like. He thinks of  philosophy as having grown out of  “an im-
pulse toward understanding nature and the human place in it, an impulse that 
was present long before the invention of  writing” (PIO, 252). Based on this 
characterization of  philosophy Kitcher identifies two axes along which 
philosophical inquiry was directed in the past and should also be directed in 
the future: the “knowledge-seeking axis” (PIO, 254) and the “value-axis” 
(PIO, 256).  
The knowledge-seeking axis represents the search for knowledge of  na-
ture. Kitcher emphasizes that the aim of  philosophy is not to produce new 
knowledge about the natural world (this is the task of  the sciences). Rather, 
philosophy can be seen as systemizing and integrating the results from 
different fields of  inquiry into an overall picture of  the world. In this way 
philosophy can satisfy the human need for orientation in, and an understand-
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ing of  the natural world (PIO, 254). Furthermore, Kitcher identifies a second 
important task of  philosophy that is directed along this first axis: Philosophy 
can assist the sciences in their search for knowledge of  nature; for instance, 
by clarifying and refining the methods that are applied and by enlightening the 
social constraints of  research (PIO, 255f.). Since the sciences are in a contin-
uous flux, the philosophical questions that are significant for a certain age will 
change, too. 
The second axis, which is called the “value-axis”, is directed towards the 
values and norms of  society. Along this axis, the task of  philosophy is to 
reflect on and to improve the state of  human moral, social, and political 
practices. This includes, for instance, exploring how people can engage in 
reflection and conversation about the meanings of  their lives. Also, with 
regard to this axis, the significance of  philosophical problems changes in 
response to new challenges of  social life. Thus, Kitcher presents a dynamic 
model of  philosophical inquiry that does not focus on certain fixed “core 
areas”, but rather is responsive to contemporary issues on nature and human 
life.  
3   OBSCURITIES IN AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 
 PRAGMATIC-NATURALISTIC VISION OF PHILOSOPHY 
3.1   Where Does Naturalism Come In? 
Kitcher’s vision of  philosophy is based upon the assumption that philosophy 
is only healthy if  it is concerned with answering questions and solving prob-
lems that matter to human lives. As we have seen, he rejects the position that 
there is something like a shared method or language that binds together 
healthy forms of  philosophy (PIO, 259). However, Kitcher himself  argues 
that philosophy should be pursued in a certain manner (that is, by a certain 
philosophical method), namely in a naturalistic fashion. In his earlier work, he 
presented some arguments in favor of  naturalism that focus mainly on the 
putative deficiencies of  the “linguistic turn”, and of  what he calls “expansion-
ist tendencies” in philosophy (PN). For various fields of  philosophy, he 




attempted to show that the appeal to supernatural entities and to a priori 
reasoning is misleading, and that empirical work is crucial to philosophical 
inquiry (see for instance NR, GDD, and EP). 
As Kitcher himself  recently calls his philosophy pragmatic naturalism, one 
might wonder, what is the relation between the pragmatic and the naturalistic 
component of  his approach. In a brief  manifesto, Kitcher claims that his 
naturalistic reconstruction of  philosophical inquiry is indeed linked to his 
pragmatic vision of  philosophy: The turn to pragmatism is understood as 
beginning “the task of  integrating the naturalist approach (…) within a more 
general philosophical view” (PN, 3). But how can this integration be spelled 
out in detail? How is the naturalistic demand related to the pragmatist de-
mand and to the program of  well-ordered philosophy?  
In the subsequent considerations we focus on naturalism as a methodo-
logical rather than an ontological thesis. Methodological naturalism, as we 
understand it here, is a thesis about what the adequate methods of  gaining 
knowledge are, including knowledge in philosophy. A methodological natural-
ist claims that “philosophy and science [are]… engaged in essentially the same 
enterprise, pursuing similar ends and using similar methods” (Papineau 2009). 
Thus, a naturalist states that there are no distinct philosophical methods like a 
priori reasoning, or thought experiments invoking philosophical intuitions, 
etc. In a more moderate version, which we assign to Kitcher, methodological 
naturalism involves the thesis that good or healthy philosophy cannot be 
pursued without relying heavily on empirical knowledge; for instance 
knowledge about how science is actually carried out, how human morality in 
fact evolved, or what the actual problems of  a present political system are.  
Based on this understanding of  naturalism, we think that there are at 
least two possibilities as to how the naturalistic character of  Kitcher’s philos-
ophy relates to his pragmatism and to the idea of  a well-ordered philosophy: 
First, the naturalistic demand could be located on the same level as the 
pragmatist demand. That is, they constitute two distinct criteria for what good 
or healthy philosophy is – the former singles out a certain philosophical 
method as appropriate, while the latter singles out certain philosophical 
questions or problems as significant. However, if  Kitcher were to choose this 
option, he would have to presuppose that the adequacy of  philosophical 
methods can be judged separately from the significance of  philosophical 
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questions. But the assumption of  a strict separation of  methods and ques-
tions in philosophy seems to be implausible. Philosophical questions and 
topics are often shaped by methodological paradigms, and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, this option threatens to conflict with Kitcher’s claim that healthy 
philosophical projects do not share a certain philosophical method. The 
naturalistic method would unify those projects, and this is what Kitcher 
rejects.  
Second, the naturalistic demand might be subordinate to and (at least 
partially) included in the pragmatist demand. That is, Kitcher could argue that 
those philosophical problems that matter to human lives and are thus signifi-
cant need to be addressed in a naturalistic manner. This second option seems 
to be best in line with how Kitcher himself  practices philosophy and with his 
idea of  philosophy as being pursued along the knowledge-seeking axis and 
the value-axis. As we have seen, Kitcher argues not only that philosophy 
should be concerned with, for instance, clarifying and refining scientific 
methods and improving human moral practices. He also insists that these 
tasks require an exploration of  the actual scientific and moral practices. If  
one follows Kitcher on his pragmatic route, it seems as if  it is inevitable to 
pursue philosophy in a naturalistic fashion. Thus, according to the second 
option, the pragmatic impulse leads to a metaphilosophical defense of  natu-
ralistic projects as well as the arguments given on the philosophical level. 
Although this option seems attractive, it is also problematic with regard 
to Kitcher’s program of  well-ordered philosophy: It is far from obvious how 
and why a democratic consensus will rule out any non-naturalistic philosophi-
cal inquiry in favor of  naturalistic ones. The decision process of  the program 
of  well-ordered philosophy could be instantiated in two different ways: First, 
the deliberators could decide which philosophical topics and problems should 
be pursued, without reflecting on the methods used to deal with these prob-
lems. In this case, Kitcher could argue that the choice of  the relevant research 
projects simply implies that these projects have to be dealt with in a natural-
istic framework. However, this is a very strong assumption for which Kitcher 
does not provide any further argumentation. Second, the deliberators could 
judge the questions and topics, on the one hand, and the methods of  lines of  
inquiry, on the other hand. In this case, it is not clear why all the people 




involved in the decision process should be convinced by the naturalistic 
method. 
Thus, both options are problematic. In the light of  these considerations, 
we think that Kitcher’s suggested integration of  naturalism and pragmatism 
remains obscure. In particular, the question of  how the naturalistic demand 
relates to metaphilosophical questions needs more attention.  
3.2   Philosophical Experts  
As we have seen, the process of  assessing the significance of  philosophical 
questions through an ideal conversation requires that the deliberators are 
informed by experts. But if  philosophers do not share reliable methods or 
languages, as Kitcher tells us, how can philosophical experts (if  they exist at 
all) be identified? 
For the case of  ethics, Kitcher explicitly denies that experts exist. As he 
puts it:  
Ethics is a social technology, one for which there are no experts. There is only the 
possibility of  conversation, ideally free of  factual mistakes and imbued with mutual 
sympathy. (SDS, 12) 
According to Kitcher, it is simply a “myth” to think of  philosophical or 
religious experts who can answer ethical questions (PIO, 257). But also with 
regard to other philosophical disciplines, he seems to reject the idea of  
experts. As we have seen, he denies that philosophers aim at distinct 
knowledge related to certain research fields. The role of  knowledge in philos-
ophy is said to be different from that in other areas. He states:  
Philosophy is not a discipline for those who are proud to know nothing but for 
people who aspire to know something of  everything so that they can propose (and 
the modest word is appropriate here) a broader perspective. (IDP, 39) 
The apparent non-existence of  philosophical experts seems problematic 
because Kitcher’s standard of  well-ordered inquiry explicitly requires experts 
at the first and third level of  the conversation: In the first stage, the delibera-
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tors have to be tutored in order to be able to understand “how the various 
fields of  inquiry are currently constituted, in the sense of  seeing how signifi-
cance is taken to accrue to projects researchers have undertaken in the past 
and a range of  options now available.” (SDS, 114) It seems that this tutoring 
of  the deliberators can only be done by people who are, in some sense, 
experts. In the case of  the sciences, Kitcher is very explicit concerning the 
involvement of  experts in the third stage of  the deliberating process. 
As [the deliberators] look toward the future, their assessment of  consequences, for 
themselves and for others, will sometimes require judgments about the likely out-
comes of  pursuing various investigations. Here they will need the testimony of  ex-
pert witnesses. The pertinent experts are selected by following chains of  deference: 
all participants initially defer to the community of  scientists; within this community, 
there is deference to fields, subfields, and ultimately to individuals. Sometimes, of  
course, there will be serious controversy, and the chains will bifurcate. When there 
are rival “experts” making incompatible forecasts, the entire package is presented to 
the deliberators, together with the grounds on which the various estimates are made, 
as well as the track records of  those who make them. (SDS, 115) 
This passage suggests that experts are very important when it comes to the 
assessment of  the possible outcomes of  investigations. Indeed, not only do 
we need some experts, we seem to need a whole network of  experts from 
several subfields, connected through chains of  deference. So how can Kitcher 
assign his standard of  well-ordered inquiry to philosophy if  there are no 
philosophical experts? 
We think that the right way to address this problem for Kitcher is to ar-
gue that philosophical experts do indeed exist although they differ from 
experts in other academic fields. He could refer to philosophical experts as 
people who have – due to their academic education – gained the aforemen-
tioned “broader perspective”, and are therefore privileged to communicate 
philosophical problems to laymen. But now two problems emerge, each 
relating to one of  the stages in the process where experts are needed. 
First, if  experts are to inform the deliberators about the state and pros-
pects of  philosophical research, they have to be selective. It seems to us that 
this is a problem especially in connection with Kitcher’s own verdict concern-
ing the fate of  philosophy. As he points out, philosophical debates do not 




have the merit of  some natural sciences of  being able to produce stable 
paradigms that can simply be passed on to the next generation of  researchers 
(PIO, 251). There is no consensus among “philosophical experts” (if  there be 
any) on the relevant methods and questions, let alone answers, that would 
have to be highlighted in a tutor program for the deliberators. Of  course, 
philosophers can try to be as neutral as possible when they explain rival 
positions including their own. They can try to bring out the advantages and 
drawbacks of  each position respectively and let the deliberators decide on 
their own. But since disagreement is, according to Kitcher, much more 
widespread in philosophy than in the natural sciences, tutors would indeed 
have to be highly selective concerning the topics they choose for the tutoring 
program and it could turn out that the different ways of  dealing with this 
“selection problem” simply mirror the personal preferences of  the respective 
tutor. 
Second, in the third stage of  the process the situation seems even worse: 
When it comes to the assessment of  the consequences of  certain research 
projects, it is very likely that philosophical experts will disagree. As Kitcher 
points out, the experts could just present the reasons for their different 
judgments to the deliberators. In the case of  philosophy it could turn out that 
this will be a package of  enormous size. It seems to us that for the delibera-
tors to be able to handle that package, they would have to be fully educated 
philosophers themselves. 
3.3   How Ideal is the Ideal? 
Some of  the points that we have raised in our discussion could be circum-
vented by Kitcher if  he simply announced that the standard of  well-ordered 
inquiry is just an ideal. There are some passages that point in this direction, for 
instance: 
There is, of  course, no easy algorithm for testing extant or proposed lines of  re-
search against the standards of  well-ordered inquiry. Often, it will be hard to decide 
how an ideally-informed and mutually-engaged discussion among a fully representa-
tive sample of  human beings would set priorities. Not always, however. (IDP, 29) 
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This passage seems to suggest that we can start to judge lines of  inquiry by 
the standard of  well-ordered inquiry without institutionalizing the public 
decision modus in the first place. The idea seems to be that the implementa-
tion of  the standard works hypothetically, so to say; for instance, by perform-
ing thought experiments (“What would the ideal deliberators say?”) each time 
we choose a new field of  inquiry. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that Kitcher points out that at least some clear cases can be judged according 
to the ideal without a real implementation. 
On the other hand, Kitcher seems to aspire to an implementation of  at 
least some initial steps of  the ideal envisaged: 
[M]eaningful ideals are those for which we can envisage a path that might lead us 
toward them, and a philosopher who proposes an ideal should be able to point to 
the initial steps we might take […]. (SDS, 125) 
In the case of  the sciences, Kitcher seems to have in mind at least two steps 
that we might take in the near future: First, he encourages scientists to popu-
larize the major ideas of  their field via books that are addressed towards a 
general public. Second, according to Kitcher, groups of  citizen representa-
tives could be tutored in certain scientific fields, approximating the tutor 
program for the ideal deliberators in the first stage of  well-ordered science 
(SDS, 128 f.). All in all, Kitcher’s vision seems to be that of  a considerable 
extension of  the idea of  Enlightenment. 
So our question is: How much of  the ideal do we really have to imple-
ment? This is of  course a delicate matter: Obviously, an implementation of  
the public tutor program would use up many resources. Of  course Kitcher is 
right when he says that “[t]o scoff  at philosophical ideals on grounds that 
they require a lot of  changes would be a serious mistake” (SDS, 125). But let 
us remember that the whole problem of  deciding which lines of  inquiry are 
to be pursued arises exactly because resources are limited. We have to weigh the 
resources that are lost through “unhealthy” research against the resources that 
would be bound by an implementation of  the standard of  well-ordered 
inquiry.  
All in all, it is not clear to us how far Kitcher wants to go towards an im-
plementation of  his ideal.  




4   CONCLUSION  
Without any doubt, Kitcher addresses a very important, and often neglected, 
question concerning the relevance of  contemporary philosophy. We agree 
with Kitcher that philosophy should not become a useless indulgence for the 
academic elite. However, we think that his suggestion of  a renewal of  philos-
ophy faces various problems that should be addressed. In particular, the 
relations between his naturalism and his metaphilosophical considerations 
remain obscure. Moreover, given the differences between philosophy and 
other sciences – which Kitcher himself  acknowledges – it is not clear what 
the program of  well-ordered philosophy will look like, and if  it is practically 
feasible in any relevant sense at all. 
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